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given the insurer by the contract. Therefore the state of the forum must apply the law
of the place where the contract was made.
The same reasoning seems applicable to divorce actions. In a divorce action the
rights and obligations of the parties arise in the state of domicile. Any attempt to
apply the law of a state other than the domiciliary state would obviously change those
rights and obligations after the causes of action on which they are based have accrued.
Therefore, it would seem that any attempt to apply the law of a state other than the
domiciliary state to a divorce action would be a violation of due process.18 It seems
obvious that the legislature of the Virgin Islands intended the Island courts to apply
their own law to divorce actions (otherwise there would be no point in attempting to
attract divorce suits). Therefore, it would seem that the clause of the statute at issue
violates due process of law. It should be noted, however, that this doctrine would not
prevent a court having only personal jurisdiction over the parties from proceeding,
provided it used the law of the domicile in deciding the case.
The decision seems to have sound sociological support. One major legal difficulty
today lies in providing safety for parties who obtain migratory divorces and later
remarry. Such a person may be married in one state yet a bigamist in another.19 True,
this difficulty has been partly overcome by decisions to the effect that migratory di-
vorces granted where both parties are before the court and domicile of one party is
technically litigated are entitled to full faith and credit.2 0 But these decisions leave the
validity of the divorce undecided, at least where a state is a party to the action in
which the issue of domicile is collaterally attacked. This problem would be greatly
aggravated by a holding that a divorce based only on personal service fulfills due
process but is not entitled to full faith and credit. Therefore, it seems preferable to
hold that domicile is requisite as a basis for jusidiction in divorce actions so long as
it is requisite for full faith and credit. John C. Arbuckle.
PARENT AND CHILD: ACTION BY CHILD FOR ALIENATION OF FATHER'S AFFEC-
TION.-The Supreme Court of Wisconsin in Scholberg v. Itnyre' held that a child has
no cause of action against a third party for the alienation of the affections of its
parent. The child, a young lady, alleged that the paramour of her father' had diverted
the cash, counsel and caresses which otherwise might have been hers.
When the child was four years old, her parents were divorced. Seven years later,
in 1941, her father took the defendant as his mistress and kept her until his death in
1952. The child, who had reached the age of twenty-two, then brought suit against
her father's nstress for the alienation of his affections asking for damages in the sum
of $100,000. The trial court held that the child had stated a good cause of action. The
court relied on article 1, section 9 of the Wisconsin Constitution which provides that
every person is entitled to a remedy for all injuries to person, property or character.
"'While it is possible today that there may be two states of doncile, such a situation usually
arises where the wife migrates and establishes domcile in the state where the divorce is to be pro-
cured. It will seldom, if ever, occur that there are two states of domicile where jurisdiction over the
person is sufficient to give a court, other than that of the domiciliary state, power to grant the
divorce.15Williams v. North Carolina (II), 325 U.S. 226 (1945).
-"Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343 (1948) ; Coe v. Coe, 334 U.S. 378 (1948), Johnson v. Muel-
berger, 340 U.S. 581 (1951).
1264 Wis. 211, 58 N.W.2d 698 (1953).
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On appeal, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin reversed, holding that it must first
be established that the plaintiff has suffered a legal injury by reason of the defendant's
conduct. This, it said, is a new right, not recognized at common law, and the creation
of new rights is a function of the legislature which the courts should not usurp.
Litigation involving this cause of action in the United States is of recent develop-
ment. Since 1934, when the question was first raised in Morrow v Yannantuono2 there
have been approximately fifteen cases, eleven rejecting this cause of action and four
allowing it. The arguments in these cases are of necessity strikingly similar. In pre-
senting the various arguments no attempt will be made to evaluate them, in the sense
of determining why the courts chose one or the other. Their presentation, rather, will
be an indication of just how the courts have arrived at their apparently conflicting de-
cisions.
In Gleztz v Glertz,3 the court held that an action for alienation of affections against
a paramour cannot be brought by a child in the absence of legislation expressly au-
thorizing it, since this action did not exist at common law. The court said that the
early common law of family relations was dominated by the Roman doctrine of pater
Jamilias, under which the father was lord and master of the household and spoke for
it. Under the common law all the rights of the family members were vested in the
father and he alone was empowered to bring an action. This being a new right,
the court held that it was therefore a question for the consideration and determination
of the legislature, a function which the courts should not usurp.
However, in Daily v Parker,4 it was held that a child does have a cause of action
against her father's paramour for alienation of affections. The court said that it may
recognize such a cause of action if it has not previously been denied by decision or
statute, because the common law is not restricted to existing rules and must continue
to expand. The courts are ever looking for precedents, but relief will not be denied
because there are none.5
In Morrow v Yannantuono the court did not allow such a cause of action. The
court said that to permit it would open our courts to a flood of litigation that would
inundate them. It would mean that "everyone whose cheek is tinged by the blush of
shame" would rush into court seeking damages to compensate him for physical and
mental injuries occasioned by philandering. However, an Illinois court in Johnson v
Luhman6 characterized this multiplicity argument as specious. Any common law ac-
tion, the court said, could be the subject of abuse if permitted to go unchecked.
In a recent California case, Rudley v Tobias,7 the court held that an action by a
child against her parent's lover is indistinguishable from an action for alienation of
affections and such actions have been abolished by statute. But in Russzck v. Hickss
the court said that this is not the traditional type of alienation of affection suit, which
is based upon the right of one spouse to recover damages for the loss of consortium,
conjugal society and assistance. The cause of action alleged here, the court said, is an
'152 Misc. 134, 273 N.Y.Supp. 912 (1934)
'88 Ohio App. 337, 98 N.E.2d 74 (1951) See also Edler v. MacAlpine-Downie, 180 F.2d 385
(D.C.Cir. 1950), Garza v. Garza, 209 S.W.2d 1012 (Tex.Civ.App. 1948)
'152 F.2d 174, 162 A.L.R. 819 (7th Cir. 1945), POUND, THE SPIRIT OF THE COMMON LAW
183 (1921)
'Henson v. Thomas, 231 N.C. 173, 56 S.E.2d 432, 12 A.L.R.2d 1171 (1949)
'330 IlLApp. 598, 71 N.E.2d 810 (1947)
'84 Cal.App.2d 454, 190 P.2d 984 (1948) See also Katz v. Katz, 197 Misc. 412, 95 N.Y.S.2d
863 (1950)
'85 F.Supp. 281 (D.C. 1949)
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action to recover damages for a direct wrong to the infant plaintiff and therefore
distinguishable.
In Miller v. Monsen9 the defendant argued that it would be extremely difficult to
assess the damages and therefore the court should not recognize a cause of action for
alienation of affection in the child. The court held that the assessment of damages,
whether easy or difficult, is the function of the jury. If the argument that damages are
too difficult to ascertain were carried to its logical conclusion, all tort actions involving
damages for pain and suffering would be subject to the same criticism.
In Scholberg v. Itnyre, the principal case, the court rejected the claim that there
was a cause of action in the child and said that a legislature winch did not grant tins
right must have withheld it for good and sufficient reason. But the courts have also
said that the existence of specific statutes protecting minors does not necessarily pre-
clude the recognition of new rights,10 and that the extension of protection to children is
a recognition of the growing public policy requiring the maintenance of such a cause
of action.
In Nelson v. Richwagen11 the court stated that a child has no legal right to the
personal presence and care of a parent. The law is satisfied, it said, if a parent provides
support and care while absent from the child. So far as the parent is bound to support
the child, the parent may be compelled to do so by other proceedings. But in the John-
son case12 the court vigorously pursued this contention maintaining that children are
entitled to both the tangible incidents of family life such as food, clothing and shelter,
and to the intangible elements of affection, moral support and guidance from both
parents. The court went on t6 trace the change that has taken place in the conception of
family life, that it is now considered a co-operative enterprise with correlative rights
and duties among all its members. The family relationship is today undoubtedly the
most important relationship upon which society depends for endurance, permanence
and well-being, and therefore warrants protection.
Perhaps all these reasons have some merit. They reflect the law as interpreted by
the courts, based upon existing statutes and precedents which in turn reflect the public
policy as expressed by the legislature. At any rate, they form some basis upon which
the courts may rest their decisions.
In the four cases which allowed the action, the plaintiffs comprised a total of
twelve minor children, all of whom were suffering actual physical deprivation because
of their parent's defalcations, the parent in three out of the four cases being the
father. In the eleven cases which rejected the action, the plaintiff in every case but one
was a single individual, not necessarily a minor at the time the suit was brought, not
in obvious want, and the parent who was enticed away in at least five of these cases
was the mother.
The underlying problem is in its last analysis a sociological one rather than a
legal one. A child has an interest in his parent's affection and company which the
courts under our system of law have the power to "legalize" by recognizing a right
of action for its protection.13 Every infraction of duty owed by one member of society
to another has legal and sociological elements involved and there is no respectable
legal system which divides grievances into two parts, the one sociological, the other
'228 Minn. 400, 37 N.W.2d 543 (1949)
"
0See note 7 supra.11326 Mass. 485, 95 N.E.2d 545 (1950).
"
2See note 7 supra; also 41 ILl. L. Rzv. 444 (1947) for an excellent discussion of the rela-
tional interests involved.
"
3Taylor v. Keefe, 134 Conn. 156, 56 AtL2d 768 (1947).
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